Confidential Informants in National Security Investigations by Ward, Daniel V
Boston College Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 5
5-1-2006
Confidential Informants in National Security
Investigations
Daniel V. Ward
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the National Security Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation





Abstract: Although a body of law has developed around the use of
confidential informants in criminal investigations, the role of infor-
mants in national security matters is less clearly defined. This Note first
examines the limitations on the use of informants in the criminal con-
text that are imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a detailed set of
guidelines issued by the Attorney General, and other sources of law. It
then turns to the treatment of informants by the major sources of na-
tional security law, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that in the national security context,
government agents are free from many of the restrictions placed on the
use of informants in criminal investigations. Although this relative free-
dom may be necessary given the immediate challenge of combating in-
ternational terrorism, care should be taken that the executive branch
does not use informants in a way that violates individual privacy or over-
steps other proper investigative boundaries.
INTRODUCTION
Informants, otherwise known as "snitches" or "rats," are people
who report to the authorities on the criminal activity of others. 1 In-
formants may be one-time providers of information or recurring agents
of law enforcement. 2 By nature, many informants are criminals them-
selves, and, as a result, law enforcement agents in the United States
often rely on criminals to help solve and prevent crimes. 3 As a practi-
cal reality, informants are a necessary evil in criminal investigations,
but employing underworld figures as allies may create legal and ethi-
I See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATFING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN TILE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-7 (2002) (introducing the role of informants throughout
history); Dick LEHR & GERARD O'NEILL, BLACK MASS: THE IRISH MOB, '111E FBI, AND A
DEVIL'S DEAL, at xiii (2000) (referring to informants as "snitch Lesj" and "rats").
2 BLOOM, supra note 1, at I.
5 See id. at 1-7.
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cal concerns.4
 Therefore, a body of law has developed around the use
of informants in criminal investigations. 5
The nation's law-enforcement agencies now face a major new
challenge: preventing another terrorist attack inside the United
States.6
 As some reports suggest, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(the "FBI") and other agencies have engaged informants with links to
terrorist organizations in order to detect and prevent future terrorist
plots.? In national security investigations, however, the policies regard-
ing informants differ from those in the criminal context.5 This Note
addresses how the rules governing the use of informants change when
national security is at stake.
The law imposes a number of restrictions on the use of infor-
mants in criminal investigations. Under the Fourth Amendment, courts
may issue search warrants on the basis of information provided by an
informant, but only upon a preliminary demonstration that the
source of such information is somewhat reliable. 9 An even more strin-
gent standard of review is imposed upon the use of informants to
support an application for electronic surveillance. 19 In addition to
these warrant requirements, other defenses and remedies exist for the
criminally accused whose rights may have been violated during an in-
vestigation involving the use of informants. 11 Furthermore, the Attor-
ney General has issued detailed guidelines regulating the manner in
4 For a discussion of the legal and ethical problems attending the use of informants in
the criminal context, see infra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
5 See Amanda J. Schreiber, Note, Dealing with the Deo& An Examination of the FBI's Trou-
bled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 CoLum. J.L. Sc Soc. PROBS. 301, 340-53
(2001).
G Robert S. Mueller III, The FBI's New Mission: Preventing Terrotht Attacks While Protecting
Civil Liberties (Address of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Occasion of the
Jackson H. Ralston Prize Ceremony), 39 STAN. J. IN•', L. 117, 120 (2003).
7 See OFFICE Oi"niEINsPi.:croR GEN., U.S. DEP'T of jusTicE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 67
(2005) [hereinafter OIG COMPLIANCE REPORT], Intp://www.usdoj.goy/oig/special/0509/
final,pdf; see also Jonathan Finer & Dan Eggcn, Two Leaders of Mosque Arrested in Albany
Sling; Pair Is Held in Alleged Plot to Sell Grenade Launcher, WASH. PosT, Aug. 6, 2004, at A3;
Caryle Murphy, Informant's Fire firings Shadowy Mk Yemeni Man Helped, Squabbled with FBI,
WAsu. PosT, Nov. 21, 2004, at AI; Shelley Murphy, FBI Finds 'Terror Threat Was Fabricated;
Tipster Suspected of Tie to Sinualing, llosToN GLOM:, Jan. 26, 2005, at Al thereinafter Mur-
phy, Tipsted; Jo Napolitano, Man Arrested in Chicago in Connection with Truck-Bomb Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at A10.
8 See infra notes 105-212 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
1 ° See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text..
" See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
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which federal agents should handle confidential informants in crimi-
nal investigations."
When conducting national' security investigations, however, fed-
eral agents have broader discretion regarding the use of informants. 13
A 1981 Executive Order grants'authority to the FBI and other agen-
cies to collect domestic national security intelligence when the target
of the investigation is an agent of a foreign power. 14 Furthermore, an
act of Congress—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA")—sets forth procedures for investigating an agent of a foreign
power that depart from the requirements of a criminal search or sur-
veillance warrant. 15 Under these provisions, federal agents may initi-
ate electronic surveillance or even physical searches without following
ordinary warrant procedures, and as a result, courts are less involved
in supervising the use of informants. 16 Additionally, new guidelines
from the Attorney General relating to national security investigations
effectively remove the restrictions placed on federal agents when it
comes to handling informants. 17
Part I of this Note introduces the body of law governing the use
of informants in criminal investigations.' 8 Part II discusses the role of
informants in the context of national security and examines the dif-
ferences between the two bodies of law. 19 In national security matters,
if the target of an investigation can be classified as an agent of a for-
eign power, the range of investigative techniques available to the FBI
and other agencies is much more extensive than in criminal investiga-
tions. 2° Furthermore, the legal protections available to criminal de-
fendants become irrelevant if no criminal prosecution results from an
intelligence investigation. 21 Part III considers whether these differ-
ences are appropriate, in light of concerns about concentrated execu-
12 See infra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 105-212 and accompanying text. -
14 Exec. Order No. 12,333, §§ 2-5, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note (2000); see infra notes 122-135 and accompanying text.
15 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-
1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)) [hereinafter FISA], amended
by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638; infra notes 136-175 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 105-175 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 176-212 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 24-104 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 105-212 and accompanying text.
21) See infra notes 105-212 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 105-212 and accompanying text.
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tive power and infringement upon individual privacy. 22 Although
these policies reflect a legitimate, elevated fear of the threat from for-
eign terrorism, they also open the door to increased and largely un-
supervised use of confidential informants acting as spies within the
United States.25
I. INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL. CONTEXT
The U.S. Constitution provides criminal defendants with certain
protections regarding information provided by confidential infor-
mants. 24
 Guidelines issued by the Attorney General also limit the ways
in which confidential informants may be utilized in criminal investiga-
tions.25 This Part discusses the standard of review for information pro-
vided by informants that is used to support a search warrant or an ap-
plication for electronic surveillance, in addition to other constitutional
protections associated with the use of informants in criminal investi-
gations.26
 It then introduces the Attorney General's guidelines on the
use of confidential informants."
A. Search Warrants and Applications for Electronic Surveillance
The Fourth Amendment states that search warrants shall issue
only upon a showing of "probable cause."28
 A judge or other magis-
trate must review an application for a search warrant and determine
that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime exists
in a particular place before issuing the warrant. 28 Police officers often
seek to establish probable cause for a search warrant based on infor-
mation provided by confidential informants. 5° In a pair of cases from
the 1960s—Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar u Texas—the U.S. Supreme
Court developed a two-prong test for determining whether informa-
tion provided by a confidential informant is sufficient to establish
22
 See infra notes 213-254 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 105-254 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 28-72 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
28 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...."); see Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410,416-19 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S 108,114 (1964).
29 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983).
90
 fiLoom, supra note 1, at 38-39.
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probable cause for a search warrant. 31 One prong of the Aguilar-
Spinelli test required that the informant have an actual basis of knowl-
edge of criminal activity, as demonstrated by a showing of specific
facts. 32 The other prong required a demonstration to a judge that that
the informant is a credible source." The two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test
was used for years, and a deficiency in either prong was enough to
undermine a finding of probable cause."
The Court later modified this rule in the 1983 case of Illinois v.
Gates by adopting a "totality of the circumstances" approach. 35 Under
Gates, the task of the magistrate issuing the warrant is to make a practi-
cal, commonsense decision as to whether probable cause exists for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, taking into account both of the
Aguilar-Spinelli factors—basis of knowledge of criminal activity and the
credibility of the informant—such that a "fair probability [exists] that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place."36 By not requiring strict adherence to either of the Aguilar-
Spinelli prongs, this test makes it easier for the police to obtain search
warrants based on information provided by confidential informants. 37
Under Gates, however, courts still are involved with evaluating the
credibility of informants used to establish probable cause in a search
warrant afficiavit. 38
Even with the Gates constitutional requirement, it is possible for
police officers to fabricate the existence of informants in order to ob-
tain a search warrant, because it is difficult to demonstrate that a po-
lice officer is lying in a search warrant application." The Supreme
Court has generally held that the identity of an informant need not
be disclosed in a warrant application, even where the defendant chal-
lenges the probable cause determination. 40 In order to get a hearing
to determine the veracity of a sworn statement in a search warrant
affidavit, a defendant first must make a substantial preliminary show-
31 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-19; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
32 See. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 41(1-19; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
33 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-19; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
See BLOOM, supra note 1, at 39.
55 462 U.S. at 238. The stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test is still used in some states, including
Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548,556-58 (Mass. 1985).
16 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
37 See id.; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-19; Agu ilrzr, 378 U.S. at 114.
se See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 ("Sufficient information must be presented to the magis-
trate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others.").
35 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,155-56 (1978).
40 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,305 (1967).
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ing that a false statement was made knowingly arid intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth. 41 This high standard makes it
difficult to convince a judge of the possibility that a police officer
might be lying in a warrant affidavit, and serves as an obstacle to get-
ting a hearing to challenge the veracity of the officer's statement. 42
Although it is impossible to know exactly how often the police invent
informants to obtain search warrants, evidence suggests that "testily-
ing" does occur in the world of law enforcement.° Nevertheless, the
fact that a court must at least review a warrant application, which
would include information provided by informants, still provides an
independent check on law enforcement discretion.44
In addition to physical searches of places or people, law enforce-
ment agents also conduct electronic surveillance in criminal investiga-
tions, including methods such as wiretapping a phone or bugging a
room.45 Like physical searches and seizures, electronic surveillance falls
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures 46 In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a warrantless listening device used in
a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches.47 Famously declaring that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places," the Court held that an individual
has an expectation of privacy in comMunications made over the tele-
phone and that therefore government agents may not employ wiretaps
without a warrant supported by probable cause." However, Katz explic-
41 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
42 See id.
45
 Bumm, supra note 1, at 43,
44 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (`The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment .... This judicial role accords with
our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will hest be preserved through a
separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of
Government.") (footnote and citation omitted).
45 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (defining electronic surveillance, for
the purposes of FISA, as the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire or radio conununication). Electronic surveillance may also
include the use of telephonic "pen registers" and "trap and trace devices." See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1841 (2000).
15 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
47 Id, at 359.
45 M. at 351, 359.
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itly left open the question of whether warrantless wiretapping would be
permitted in situations involving national security. 49
After Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act in 1968." Title III of the Act permits electronic sur-
veillance under particular conditions. 51 Judicial authorization must be
sought for electronic surveillance intended to prevent certain serious
crimes, and the law enforcement officer making the Title III applica-
tion must explain to the judge why other methods of information col-
lection have been tried and failed, or would be dangerous or likely to
fail in the given situation. 52 Title Elf applications require a showing of
probable cause related to serious crimes specifically delineated in the
Act.53 With regard to informant reliability, Title III applications are
actually subjected to a higher standard of review than ordinary search-
or-seizure warrants." Internal Department of Justice guidelines state a
preference that informants supporting Title III applications be
qualified under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, rather than the more relaxed
Gates standard. 55 Such a preference demonstrates a concern by the De-
partment of Justice that electronic surveillance may be even more in-
vasive of liberty than physical searches, because electronic surveil-
lance can occur entirely in secret without notice to the target and can
help law enforcement obtain a vast amount of information about the
target.56
49 Id. at 358 n.23 ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a
question not presented in this case.").
5° Omnibus Crime Control and Sale Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C), amended
by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638, and Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
51 Id. § 802, 82 Stat. at 212-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000
& Stipp. III 2003)); see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
52 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (c) (2000).
55
 Id. § 2518(3) (a). A list of offenses fOr which electronic surveillance may be con-
ducted with a Title III court order appears at 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000 & Supp. Iii 2003),
amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 6907, 118 Stat. at 3774, and Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1171(b), 119 Stat. at 3123.
" See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
55 See. U.S. DEFT JusucE, UNrrEn STATES M- FORNEYS' MANUAL: Trrt.E 9, CRIMINAL RE-
SOURCE MANUAL § 29(C) (1 997), available at hop://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usam/title9/crin00029.1am [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL.] (citing Gates,
462 U.S. 213; Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410; Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108).
56 See id.
634	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 97:627
B. Other Protections and Defenses
Other constitutional amendments also offer some protection to
criminal defendants when the prosecution's case is built on evidence
obtained from informants. The Sixth Amendment provides protection
to the accused once judicial proceedings have commenced. 57 In the
1964 case of Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
government may not use an informant as an agent to deliberately
elicit statements from a suspect after the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings—the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at-
taches.58
 The Supreme Court affirmed the Massiah doctrine in the
1980 case of United States v. Henry, holding that the government may
not deliberately employ jailhouse informants to initiate conversations
with other inmates and thereby encourage incriminating statements. 59
The Sixth Amendment is not violated, however, if a jailhouse infor-
mant is merely a passive listener who reports on the incriminating state-
ments of other inmates, but does nothing to elicit those statements
intentionally. 60
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also pro-
tects defendants from the use of certain statements made to infor-
mants. 6I Under the "voluntariness" standard, due process requires that
the police not use oppressive or coercive conduct to obtain statements
from criminal suspects. 62 The Court has applied the Fourteenth Amend-
ment voluntariness standard to the context of informants acting as gov-
ernment agents, holding that statements made to an informant may be
suppressed if the informant is working as an agent of the government
and if the statements are coerced by the informant in the scope of that
agency.63
57 See U.S. CoNs -r. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
58 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
59 447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980).
60 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
61 See U.S. CoNs•r. amend. XIV; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
62
 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to state action, the voluntariness inquiry is the same tinder the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government.
E.g., Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).
63 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). The Court has also held, how-
ever, that the harmless error standard applies to such statements—a standard that makes it
less likely that convictions will be reversed when partially based upon coerced Incriminat-
ing statements made to informants. See id. at 295.
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Finally, other defenses may be available to criminal defendants
when informants arc involved, including the doctrines of entrapment
and outrageous government cOnduct." While not constitutional in
origin, these defenses may be invoked under exceptional circumstances
to dispose of an indictment altogether. 65 In the 1992 case of Jacobson. v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that "[gloverninent agents may
not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind
the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission
of the crime so that the Government may prosecute." 66 Thus, a crimi-
nal defendant may raise a defense of entrapment where an informant,
working . as a government agent, actually induces the defendant to
commit a crime and where that defendant otherwise lacked the pre-
disposition to commit that crime. 67
A related defense is outrageous government conduct, which is simi-
lar to the defense of entrapment except that it focuses on the conduct
of the government rather than on the predisposition of the defendant. 68
Presumably, there may be circumstances where an informant, acting as a
government agent, engages in conduct that is so outrageous during the
course of an investigation that it warrants the dismissal of the indict-
ment.69 The Second Circuit has expressed reluctance to dismiss indict-
ments based on this defense, however, concluding that it is the province
of the executive branch to determine the appropriate hounds of con-
duct for its investigative agents, including informants."
Alternatively, an individual who is not accused of a crime, but
whose rights have been violated by the use of informants, may also
seek civil damages from the government. In the 1971 case of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme
Court held that individuals may sue federal agents for money dam-
ages arising from violations of their constitutional rights that occur
during the course of an investigation, even when no criminal prosecu-
tion results. 71
 The Bivens doctrine is the common-law analog to 42
61 See Schreiber, supra note 5, at 344-49.
65 See id.
66 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992).
See id. at 548-51.
68 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973). In United States v. Russell, the
Court suggested that there may be circumstances where the government's investigatory
conduct is so outrageous that dismissal of an indictment may be warranted on due process
grounds. Id.
6© See id.
7° See United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2(1 272, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1970).
71 See 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a statutory right for individuals to sue
state and local government actors for civil rights violations."
C. "Top Echelon" and the Attorney General's Informant Guidelines
Although the safeguards .discussed above exist to protect the
rights of individuals from the unscrupulous use of informants by the
government, law enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI, exercise
significant discretion regarding the use of informants." In order to
combat organized crime (once the top priority of the Bureau), the
FBI developed a highly secretive, effective, and potentially dangerous
system for gathering intelligence through informants—the Top Eche-
lon Informant Program. 74 In the FBI vernacular, Top Echelon ("TE")
informants are those who are directly involved with high levels of or-
ganized crime and are therefore serious criminals themselves."
The TE Informant Program has its roots in the 1950s, when the
FBI began to shift its focus from investigating communism to fighting
the Mafia." In order to gather quality information on the mob, the
FBI needed informants, but informants were rare in the Mafia world
because members of the organization took oaths requiring them to
kill anyone among them who provided information to law enforce-
ment.77 As a result, the FBI launched the ambitious TE Informant
Program, which sought to recruit active, ranking members of the
Mafia as informants, with the government guaranteeing absolute
confidentiality regarding their identities in exchange for informa-
tion."
The TE program existed almost entirely in secrecy until criminal
proceedings in Boston in the late 1990s revealed its sordid details."
The ethical and legal challenges facing the FBI in choosing to associate
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
73 See infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text.
74 See RALPH RANALLI, DEADLY ALLIANCE: THE FBI's SECRET PARTNERSH/P WITH THE
MOB 56-60 (2001).
75 See id. at 57.
76 Id. at 48-49.
77 United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Stipp. 2d 141,287 (D. Mass. 1999) ("Each took an
oath swearing, among other things, that he would abide by `omerta,' the code of silence.
On at least two occasions, the inductee promised to kill without hesitation any police in-
formant posing a threat to the Family, even if the informant were his son or brother."),
rev it in part sub nom. United States v. Flemrni, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000); RANALLI, supra
note 74, at 55.
76 RANALLI, 52IPra note 74, at 57-59.
79 See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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with criminals came to light at that time when Massachusetts District
Court Judge Mark L. Wolf conducted a lengthy set of pretrial hearings
in the case of United States v. Salemme, thereby uncovering the extensive
relationship between the FBI and its informants in the Boston area. 80
According to the court's findings, two of Boston's most notorious or-
ganized crime figures, James "Whitey" Bulger and Stephen "The
Rifleman" Flemmi, had been acting as TE informants for the FBI for
decades. 81 Bulger and Flemmi provided information on the criminal
organization La Cosa Nostra (the "LCN") in exchange for the FBI's
sanction of their own loan-sharking and gambling activities. 82 Thus,
while their own criminal enterprise (known as the Winter Hill Organi-
zation) flourished, Bulger and Flemmi supplied valuable information
to the FBI, effectively wiping out their rivals in the LCN. 85 The court's
findings uncovered a scandal that resulted in the conviction of FBI
agent John Connolly for protecting Bulger and Flemmi, his valued in-
formants, and for tipping off Bulger to his eventual indictment. 84
Flemmi reached a plea agreement 11w his cooperation in other cases,
and Bulger is still a fugitive, currently on the FBI's Top Tcn Most
Wanted List. 85
In response to the Boston scandal, Attorney General Janet Reno
issued, in January of 2001, a document titled, "Guidelines Regarding
the Use of Confidential Informants." 86 Older versions of informant
guidelines had existed in some form since 1976, when they were im-
plemented in an attempt to reform the FBI's investigative techniques
in light of revelations of abuses of power by the Bureau. 87 The Reno
review of the guidelines was spurred in large part by evidence of the
FBI's mishandling of Bulger and Flemmi, and the resulting guidelines
88 See 91 F. Stipp. 2d at 175-316. For further discussion of the legal implications ol'
Salernme, see BLoom, supra note 1, at 81-105; Schreiber, supra note 5, at 330-41.
61 Salemme, 91 F. Stipp. 2d at 148-49. Fur detailed accounts of the Bulger/Flemmi af-
fair, see generally LEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 1, and RANALLI, supra note 74.
82 Salemme, 91 F. Stipp. 2d at 151-57.
83 Id. at 149-57.
84 See United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2003).
83 See Connolly, 341 F.3(1 at 19, 21; Shelley Murphy & Stephen Kurkjian, Flemmi Alleges
More FRI Payoffs, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2005, at Al; FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives,
littp://www.ibi.gov/mostwant/topten/Ingitives/Ingitives.hun
 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
66 OFFICE OF	 ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP .T OF JUSTICE', DEPAR'FMENT OF JUSTICE
GUIDELINES REGARDING	 USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS (2001), http://www.us.
doj,gov/ag/reaclingroont/ciguidelines.htm [hereinafter RENO GU I I WIT NES]; see OIG CoM-
NCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 57-58.
87 See OIG COMPLIANCE REPORT, stipra note 7, at 36-59.
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were an attempt to correct those mistakes. 88 The guidelines were re-
issued by former Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2002 in substan-
tially similar form to the Reno version (the "Informant Guidelines");
this newer version remains in effect today. 89
The current Informant Guidelines are applicable to all domestic
investigations conducted by agencies within the Department of Jus-
tice, including the FBI.99 The Guidelines are designed to control the
relationship between informants and their government handlers; they
establish standards governing the suitability of informants and require
a higher-ranking FBI official than the case agent to review annually
each informant's file.91 Additionally, they establish a Confidential In-
formant Review Committee within the FBI to assess periodically the
ongoing suitability of registered informants.92 The Guidelines
specifically state that the FBI may not withhold the identity of its in-
formants if the information is requested by any federal prosecutor's
office. 93 Furthermore, the Guidelines describe in detail the kind of
behavior that is prohibited between an informant and a federal agent,
including a ban on the exchange of gifts or other monetary payments
without specific approval."
Another major restriction imposed by the Informant Guidelines
concerns immunity. 95 The Informant Guidelines state that federal law
enforcement agents may not immunize informants from prosecution
for specific crimes, nor authorize the commission of certain future
crimes, in exchange for information—at least, not without prior ap-
proval of an official within the Department of Justice. 96 Furthermore,
the Guidelines prevent agents from making, without prior written ap-
proval from a U.S. Attorney's office, "any promise or commitment ...
BB
 See id.
" See generally OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEPT OF 1USTICE, THE ATFOHNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS (2002), Imp://
usdoigov/olp/dojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter INFORMANT GUIDELINES]; RENO GUIDELINES,
Supra note 86.
90 See infra notes 180-197 and accompanying text.
91 INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 9.
92 Id. at 5, 10. Once an individual has been deemed suitable to be a confidential in-
formant, that person is "registered" as such, and certain records on that informant must be
kept on file. Id. at 1
93 Id. at 5.
91 Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 5, 19-24.
99 INFORMANT GUIDELINES, SUPra note 89, at 5, 19-24.
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that would limit the use of any evidence by the government" against
the informant.97
These prohibitions in the Informant Guidelines reflect a ruling by
the First Circuit in United States v. Fiemmi regarding "use immunity," or
immunity with respect to the fruits of electronic surveillance." The
court held that when an informant offers evidence to support a Title III
application, an individual FBI agent does not have the authority to im-
munize that informant as to any incriminating statements that might
later be intercepted in the course of the resulting surveillance. 99 An
agent may promise to keep the identity of the informant confidential,
but he or she may not grant any form of immunity without seeking fur-
ther authorization from an official within the Department of justice. 100
The Informant Guidelines essentially incorporate this holding.m
A recent review of the FBI's compliance with the Guidelines, con-
ducted by the Office of the Inspector General (the "OIG") and detailed
in a report issued in September 2005, found that the Bureau has not
adequately supported or implemented the Informant Guidelines.m
The OIG's comprehensive compliance report noted that the FBI is in
the process of considering significant changes to its informant pro-
gram, and it made several specific recommendations for properly im-
plementing the Informant Guidelines.'" The report's findings also in-
dicated the ongoing importance of informants to FBI investigations, as
well as the necessity of maintaining and improving procedures for
proper oversight of criminal informants. 1 °4
II. INFORMANTS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT
As discussed in Part I, there are limits on how law enforcement
agents may use informants in criminal investigations. 105 When the nature
of an investigation involves a threat to national security, however, differ-
97 Id. at 5. The Supreme Court has held that the government. must disclose evidence of
any understanding or agreement as to protection front a future prosecution of any witness
actually testifying for the prosecution in a criminal trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150,154-55 (1972). Of course, this only matters when informants actually testify. See id.
99 See 225 F.3d at 80-81.
99 M.
190 Id. at 87-88.
101 See INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 19-25.
In See OIG COMPLIANCE REPotrr, supra note 7, at 1,3,7-9,57-58,63-135.
10 ' Id. at 133-35.
nu Id.
105 See supra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
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ent rules apply. 1 °6 Courts have granted the executive branch broad dis-
cretion over national security matters. 1 °7 The Supreme Court has left
open the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies in national
security investigations, 08 and several circuit courts of appeals have held
that it does not. 14" Consequently, in the field of national security, federal
investigative agencies arc governed by three alternative sources of
authority: a 1981 executive order issued by President Reagan, 110 a con-
gressional act from 1978, 111 and guidelines issued by the Attorney Geti-
era1. 112 This Part discusses the role of informants in national security in-
vestigations, as construed from these sources of authority. 113
A. Executive Order No. 12,333 and Intelligence Investigations
The President has the fundamental duty to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."114 From this executive
duty flows the power of executive agencies to investigate and ultimately
defend the country from foreign threats. 115 When national security is at
stake, courts have granted the federal government's executive branch
the authority to act outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 116
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the executive power to
conduct warrantless searches in national security investigations in 1972
106 See infra notes 107-212 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 120-121, 152-155, and accompanying text.
Ic's United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
10 See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
II° Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U .S.C.§ 401 note (2000).
tit FISH, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
2518, 2519, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (2000 &
Stapp. III 2003)), amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
12 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEPT' OF JUSTICE, THE ATFORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION (U) (2003) [hereinafter NSI GUIDELINES], available at http://www.uscloj.gov/
olp/nsiguidelines.pdf; OFFICE OF 'HIE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CHIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND
TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (2002) [hereinafter DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDE-
LINES], available at littp://www.usdoj.goviolp/generalcrimes2.pdr.
113 See infra notes 114-212 and accompanying text.
114 U.S. CoNs .r. art. II, § 1; see Keith, 407 U.S. at 310 ("Implicit in that duty is the power
to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful
means.").
is see Keith, 407 U.S. at 310. For a complete discussion of the President's power to de-
fend national security, see generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL. WAR POWER (2004).
116 See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
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in United States v. U.S. District Cann (Keith). 117 In Keith, the Court held
that federal law enforcement agents must seek warrants for searches
when the target of the investigation is purely "domestic," even when the
investigation implicates national security concerns.' 18 The ruling at the
time applied to both physical searches and electronic surveillance. 119
However, the Keith Court specifically left open the issue of the existence
of executive power to conduct warrantless searches or surveillance with
respect to the activities of "foreign powers or their agents." 12° Conse-
quently, it has been left to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals to recog-
nize a limited national security exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement; four courts have done so, although the Supreme
Court has not explicitly approved this vicw. 121
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,333,
thereby claiming for the executive branch the power to conduct war-
rantless searches and surveillance of agents of a foreign power)22
Within the executive branch, the FBI is the entity primarily responsi-
ble for gathering domestic national security intelligence.'" The Ex-
ecutive Order places the FBI in charge of gathering intelligence
within the United States, leaving the Central Intelligence Agency (the
"CIA") responsible for gathering intelligence abroad. 124 The FBI thus
functions not only as a federal police force, but also as a domestic spy
agency. 125 The Bureau maintains an Office of Intelligence that shares
information with other intelligence agencies throughout the federal
government. 126 Other entities within the "intelligence community" of
112 See 407 U.S. at 321; David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the
Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 622.
407 U.S. at 321.
119 See id.
129 Id.
121 See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2c1 908, 914-16 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de.
nied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2(1871, 875 (9th Cin), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603-05 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
branov V. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th
Cir, 1973), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 960 (1974); see also Eggert, supra note 117, at 623-25.
122 Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note (2000).
122 Id. §1.14(a), 3 C.F.R. at 210, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
124 See id. § 1.8, 3 C.F.R. at 205, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note; id. § 1.14(a), 3 C.F.R.
at 210, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
122 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 120.
126 Id.
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the executive branch include the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the National Security Agency.'"
Executive Order No. 12,333 grants the Attorney General the
power to authorize investigative techniques that otherwise would re-
quire a warrant if the Attorney General determines in each case that
there is probable cause to believe that the "technique" is directed
against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.' 28 The Order
does not define the term "technique," although it states that "[e]lectronic
surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well 'as this
Order."129 Because the language only qualifies the term "technique" by
stating that electronic surveillance must be conducted in accordance
with FISA, an inference may be drawn that the word "technique" in-
cludes electronic surveillance as well as other investigative practices,
such as traditional physical searches.'" "Foreign intelligence" is defined
as "information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of
foreign powers, organizations or persons." 191 These provisions there-
fore authorize the FBI, at the direction of the Attorney General, to cir-
cumvent the warrant requirement when national security is at risk from
a foreign threat. 132 Such searches must be undertaken for intelligence
purposes only, not "law enforcement" purposes—meaning that evi-
dence collected without a warrant would still not be admissible in a
criminal prosecution.'"
The Executive Order makes no explicit reference to the use of
confidential informants, but by eliminating the warrant requirement, it
authorizes federal agents to conduct searches based on uncorroborated
information from informants, without any concern for satisfying the
Illinois v. Gales standards for informant use in criminal investigations.'m
Therefore, under the provisions of Executive Order No. 12,333, intelli-
127
 Exec. Order No. 12,333, §§ 1.4—.14, 3 C.F.R. at 202-10, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note.
12B Id. § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (2000). For a discussion of
the term "agent of a foreign power" as defined by F1SA, see infra notes 147-151 and ac-
companying text.
129
 Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982), reprinted in 50 U,S.C. § 401
note.
130 See id., reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
131 See id. § 3.4(d), 3 C.F.R. at 215, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
132 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
133 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 318-24; Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. at 212, reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
154 See 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 note (2000); supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
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gence agencies could act on any information received from informants
that they deem credible, without having to demonstrate to an inde-
pendent court that the informant is reliable or has specific knowledge
indicating that terrorist actions are afoot. 135
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
The Keith Court held that the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement does apply in domestic national security investigations.'"
The case left open, however, the constitutionality of warrantless surveil-
lance of foreign organizations or individuals in national security inves-
tigations)" Although circuit courts of appeals have subsequently rec-
ognized an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
in national security investigations, the precise scope of executive
authority in such cases has not been defined by the Supreme Court or
the circuits. 135 In the 1952 Supreme Court case Youngstown Sheet & 'Abe
Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), justice Jackson expressed the classic articula-
tion of the inherent power of the executive and its relationship to con-
gressional authority)" Where the President acts pursuant to an "ex-
press or implied authorization of Congress," Jackson wrote, "his
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate."'" Although there may
be a "zone of twilight" where Congress and the executive branch have
concurrent authority, once Congress expresses its will on a subject, the
President is bound by the legislative action."' As to the executive
branch's power to conduct electronic surveillance and other forms of
searches in national security investigations—a "zone of twilight" of con-
current presidential and congressional authority—Congress expressed
its will in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.142
Enacted partially as a response to the Keith decision, FISA was de-
signed to provide procedures for obtaining prior judicial approval of
175 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note.
136
 407 U.S. at 320-21.
137 See id. at 321-22; see also Eggert, supra note 117, at 623.
133 See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
139
 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concurring).
to Id. at 635.
11 See id. at 637.
"2
 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518,
2519, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (2000 & Stipp. III
2003)), amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3638; see also In re Seated Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3c1 717, 719 (FISA
Ct. Rev. 2002).
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electronic surveillance in national security matters. 143 In ordinary
criminal investigations, Title III court orders must be obtained from a
federal district court in order to perform electronic surveillance.'" But
Title III did not address the issue of whether warrants for electronic
surveillance are required in national security cases. 145
 FISA created the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the "FISC"), a special court
that operates in secret, to issue warrants for electronic surveillance in
national security matters. 146 Federal agents may apply directly to the
FISC for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance against an
"agent of a foreign power" without having to make an application in
open federal district court. 147 FISA defines an "[a]gent foreign power"
as any person who "engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the
United States contrary to the interests of the United States" on behalf
of a foreign power. 148 The term "agent of a foreign power" is also used
in Executive Order No. 12,333, but it is not defined there; because the
terms of the Order itself require adherence with FISA, the Order's
definition of this term is evidently the same as that in FISA. 149 An FISC
judge may issue an order for electronic surveillance upon finding
probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. 15° Because
145 See Eggert, supra note 117, at 638.
144 See 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (2000); supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
145 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000 & Stipp. III 2003); see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719.
147 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (1) (A) (2000); see id. § 1801(b) (defining "[ajgent of a foreign
power"), amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, and USA PATRIOT Authorization and Improvement
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). In 2004, Congress inserted
subsection (b) (1)(C) in 50 U.S.C. § 1801, adding to the definition of laJgent of a foreign
power" any person other than a U.S. person who "engages in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therelitre." Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. No, 108-458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C:.
§ 1801(b) (1) (C)), amended by USA PATRIOT Authorization and Improvement Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). This subsection is scheduled to expire on
December 31, 2009, along with provisions of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA
PATRIOT Act"). See USA PATRIOT Authorization and Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L
No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
145 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b); see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
149 Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
note (2000).
150 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). If the target of the surveillance is a U.S. citizen or otherwise a
legal resident of the United States, then there must be probable cause to believe that the
target's activities involve espionage or other similar conduct in violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States, and the surveillance application must riot rely solely upon the
basis of speech, association, and other activities protected by the First Amendment. Id.
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an agent of a foreign power is defined as someone "other than a
United States person" operating "in the United States," FISA is not con-
cerned with surveillance conducted against aliens in foreign lands. 151
Because Congress has specifically granted the executive limited
powers to conduct electronic surveillance and even physical searches
without a warrant within the United States in national security investi-
gations through FISA, there is a presumption, under Justice Jackson's
formula in Steel Seizure, that such conduct is constitutiona1. 152 Indeed,
the electronic surveillance provisions of FISA have been upheld as con-
stitutional by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.'" And although the
Supreme Court has never explicitly upheld warrantless physical
searches in national security cases, the Fourth Circuit has recognized a
general national security exception to the warrant requirement for
conducting foreign intelligence surveillance—meaning that such sur-
veillance lies outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 154 There-
fore, FISA, and not Fourth Amendment caselaw, provides the primary
external check on the investigatory methods of the executive branch in
national security matters. 155
C. FISA Mechanics and Informants
Although FISA requires prior judicial approval of electronic sur-
veillance in foreign intelligence investigations in most instances, war-
rantless surveillance may be authorized directly by the Attorney Gen-
eral if certain procedures are followed. 156 Under § I 802(a), the
Attorney General may authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for
up to one year if it is directed solely against a foreign power and there is
§ 1801(b); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (3) (A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); see supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
151 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (emphasis added); see supra note 147 and accompanying text;
see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990) (holding that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment do nut extend to non-citizens in foreign lands lack-
ing "substantial connection" with the United States). By contrast, the Court held in United
States v. Verelugn-Unptirlez that once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country, he or
she becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including the full
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 494 U.S. at 271-72. What Verdugo-Urquidez leaves
ambiguous is what constitutes a "substantial connection" !Or illegal aliens inside or outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See id.
152 See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 634-37 (,Jackson, J., concurring); supra notes 136-151
and accompanying text.
155 See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 71-76 (2d Cir. 1984).
154 See Truong Dinh flung, 629 F.2d at 914-16.
155 See supra notes 136-154 and accompanying text.
156 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
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no substantial likelihood that communications of a U.S. person will be
intercepted. 157
 The Attorney General is required, however, to provide
certification of such action to the FISC immediately after ordering the
surveillance. 158 FISA also provides the Attorney General with "emer-
gency" power to initiate electronic surveillance without prior judicial
approval under § 1805 if an application is made to the FISC within sev-
enty-two hours of the initiation of surveillance. 159 Although these provi-
sions act as a limitation on the kinds of monitoring that federal agents
may conduct, they do allow for some degree of warrantless surveil-
lance. 16°
Under FISA, law enforcement may also perform physical searches
without a warrant under certain circumstances.' 6' As amended in
1994, RSA grants the Attorney General the power to authorize war-
rantless physical searches for up to one year to acquire foreign intelli-
gence information, where the search is directed solely at property in
the open and exclusive control of a foreign power and there is no
substantial likelihood that a U.S. person will be targeted in the
search. 162 Just as with electronic surveillance, the Attorney General
must submit certification of warrantless physical searches to the FISC
immediately after they occur. 163 Federal agents also may apply for
FISA warrants for physical searches, just as they may apply for elec-
tronic surveillance warrants. 164
Like Executive Order No. 12,333, FISA does not specifically refer
to the use of confidential informants.' 65 In ordinary search warrants
and Title III applications, informants are frequently cited as sources
of information to establish probable cause. 166 Presumably, then, in-
formation provided by confidential informants is likewise used to ob-
tain FISA warrants. 167 Unlike in the ordinary warrant and Title III ap-
plication context, however, the precise standard applied by the FISC
to informant qualification is not known because the court operates in
187 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1) (2000).
158 Id. § 1802(a) (3).
159 50 U.S.C. § 1805(1) (Supp. 111 2003).
16° See supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
161 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1822, 1823(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
162 Id. §§ 1822, 1823(a).
163 Id. §§ 1802(a) (3), 1821(4)(D), 1822(a) (1).
164
 See id. §§ 1823-1824.
165 See id. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871.
166 See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
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secret. 168
 Moreover, since FISA was enacted, only one case has been
appealed to the special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review, resulting in just one published opinion, and this opinion did
not address informants. 169 However, an internal FBI guidance memo
shows that the FBI has adopted a "totality-of-the-circumstances" ap-
proach as its standard for informant qualification in FISA applica-
tions—a standard that comports with the Fourth Amendment re-
quirement established in Gates. 17° Although the Justice Department
recommends the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for Title III applications, the
FBI does not suggest this stricter standard in FISA applications. 171
Precisely because it operates in secret, one could argue that it would
make sense for the FISC to require a higher standard for informant
qualification than the Gates "totality" approach, for there is no need to
protect the secret identity of informants in FISA applications. 172 On
the other hand, the interest in protecting national security by allow-
ing the surveillance favors a lower quantum of proof for securing the
ability to conduct surveillance—an interest perhaps reflected in the
fact that in calendar years 2003 and 2004, a combined 3485 FISA war-
rant applications were made, and only four were denied,'" But if and
when the Attorney General authorizes warrantless searches or surveil-
lance, there is no prior judicial review of the credibility of the infor-
mants providing the basis for investigative activities. 174 In such cases,
168 See .supra note 146 and accompanying text.
' 69 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719.
17° See FBI Office of Gen. Counsel, What Do I Have to Do to Get a FISA?, at 2-3,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/lisa-recipe.pdf
 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006); see
also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Resource Page, Imp://
www.epic.org/privag/terrorism/ftsa/
 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006) (explaining that the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center obtained the internal Fill guidance mento under a
Freedom of Information Act request). According to this document, "in judging the reli-
ability of the information presented by the government, look to the totality of the informa-
tion and consider its reliability on a case-by-case basis." See F131 Office of Gen. Counsel,
supra, at 3. The document specifically refers to Gates as "instructive." Id.; see Gates, 462 U.S,
at 238.
171 See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 55, § 29(C); supra note 170 and ac-
companying text.
172 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
1 " WILLIAM E. MOSCHELLA, OFFICE OF 'THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GEN., 2004 ANNUAL
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS (2005), available at
http://www.usacti.gov/oipr/readingroom/2004fisa-ltr.pdf;
 WILLIAM E. MOSCHELIA, OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GEN., 2003 ANNUAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. SURVEILLANCE Act .
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004), available at littp://www.ust4gov/oipr/reaclingrootn/2003
ftsa-1 tr.pdf.
174 See supra notes 156-171 and accompanying text.
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federal agents are bound only by internal Department of Justice inves-
tigative guidelines. 175
D. The Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines
Former Attorney General John Ashcroft issued several sets of
guidelines in 2002 and 2003 governing the investigative practices in
both domestic and foreign national security investigations. 176 These
guidelines represent the executive branch's internal controls over in-
vestigative methods used by the FBI and other agencies, and they are
most relevant to an agent's day-to-day investigative authority)" Un-
surprisingly, the Bureau has a freer hand in national security investi-
gations than in criminal investigations, particularly when the target of
the investigation is an agent of a foreign power. 178 These guidelines,
while not legally binding, are evidence of the policy choices that the
administration of President George W. Bush has made regarding the
utilization of confidential informants)"
The Informant Guidelines are not applicable to investigations of
foreign intelligence, since, by their own terms, they apply only to do-
mestic criminal investigations and prosecutions. 180 They do not apply
to the use of informants in foreign countries, unless the informant is
reasonably likely to be called as a witness in a domestic case) 81 Nor do
the Informant Guidelines apply to the use of confidential informants
in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence investigations) 82
More recent guidelines address national security investigations
specifically) 83 On May 30, 2002, Ashcroft introduced an updated set of
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism
Enterprise Investigations (the "Domestic Security Guidelines"). 184 The
terrorism provisions in the Domestic Security Guidelines are applicable
to the FBI's investigations of groups that originate and operate inside
the United States)85 The Domestic Security Guidelines state that they
175 See infra notes 176-197 and accompanying text.
178 See 010 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 17, 22-23.
177
	 id.
178 See infra notes 180-212 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 180-212 and accompanying text.
ISO INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 1.
181 Id.
182
185 See infra notes 184-212 and accompanying text.
184 See generally DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 112.
185 See id. at ii.
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arc not intended to supersede any applicable provisions of the Infor-
mant Guidelines. 186 .
In criminal investigations, the Domestic Security Guidelines limit
the FBI to investigating completed criminal acts or to collecting crimi-
nal intelligence information on an ongoing criminal enterprise. 187
However, neither the Informant Guidelines nor the Domestic Security
Guidelines are applicable to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
investigations, or to operations in a foreign country.' 88 Investigations of
terrorist groups originating internationally but operating within the
United States are covered by a separate set of guidelines. 189 Therefore,
although the Domestic Security Guidelines limit the scope of FBI inves-
tigations into criminal matters and, to a lesser extent, domestic terrorist
threats, they do not limit investigations involving international terror-
ists. 19°
The Domestic Security Guidelines basically preserve the Infor-
mant Guidelines in domestic criminal investigations, although they
relax the conditions under which informants may be engaged. 191 The
Domestic Security Guidelines set forth the investigative procedures
that may be used by FBI agents in preliminary inquiries and full inves-
tigations. 192 Agents may begin a preliminary inquiry without even a
"reasonable indication" of criminal activity when there is information
or an allegation not warranting a full investigation, but still requiring
further scrutiny beyond the prompt and limited checking of initial
leads.'" The development of informants is a method available to
agents at the preliminary inquiry stage.'" The Domestic Security
Guidelines are ambiguous as to whether agents at the preliminary in-
quiry stage may develop new informants or only interview previously
established informants. 195 The language authorizes agents to interview
"previously established informants, and other sources of information,"
but the introduction to the Domestic Security Guidelines states that
"[o] ther methods, including the development of sources and infor-
186 Id. at 23.
187 Id. at 12.
188 Id. at ii; INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at I.
189 See infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
190 See DomEsTic Stxuart.v Gut nELINES, supra note 112, at 2-3.
191 See infra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.
192 DOMESTIC SECURITY GU IDELINES, supra note 112, at 8-12.
193 Id. at 8.
194 Id. at 1.
i95 See id. at 1,10.
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mants" are available at the preliminary inquiry stage.'" Allowing
agents at the preliminary stage not only to use established informants,
but also to develop new ones, means that agents are largely unre-
stricted in terms of when they may seek and develop informants, al-
though they still must act within the boundaries set forth in the In-
formant Guidelines.' 97
E. The Attorney General's National Seiwrity Investigations Guidelines
When the target of a national security investigation is "an agent
of a foreign power," the Informant Guidelines do not apply at all, at
least based on a reading of the Guidelines for FBI National Security
Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (the "NSI Guide-
lines"), introduced on October 31, 2003. 198
 The NSI Guidelines apply
only to the FBI, and they cover investigations of foreign powers and
international terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, operating within
the United States.'" Portions of these guidelines are classified. 2" The
NSI Guidelines afford the FBI very broad power to investigate foreign
terrorist organizations operating within the United States. 201
Executive Order No. 12,333 and FISA essentially authorize the
FBI to engage in domestic spying, where the targets of investigation
are foreign powers or their agents. 202
 The NSI Guidelines reflect that
authority, granting FBI agents broad power to collect foreign national
security intelligence beyond what is acceptable in criminal investiga-
tions.203
 The unclassified portions of the NSI Guidelines state that the
"scope of authorized activities ... is not limited to 'investigation' in a
narrow sense, such as solving particular cases Rather, these activi-
ties also provide critical information needed for broader analytic and
intelligence purposes authorized by Executive Order 12333 ... ."" 4
This passage allows FBI agents to undertake broad intelligence inves-
196 Id.
197 See DOMESTIC SECURITY Gut DELINES, supra note 112, at I, 10, 23.
198
 See generally NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112.
' 99 See id. at ii, 1-2.
2°° Id. at 3-38.
201 Id. at 1-2, 11.
202 See supra notes 122-175 and accompanying text.
2" NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at ii; see supra notes 122-175 and accompanying
text (discussing Executive Order No. 12,333 and FISA). The FBI's authority to collect intel-
ligence in criminal investigations is outlined in the Domestic Security Guidelines. See supra
notes 187-197 and accompanying text.
21}1
 NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at 11.
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tigations, outside the bounds defined for criminal or even domestic
terrorism investigations.205
The unclassified portions of the NSI Guidelines are interesting
for what they do not say: they make no reference to informants at
all. 206 Furthermore, the Informant Guidelines themselves state that
they are not applicable to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
investigations.207 Therefore, when investigating international terrorist
organizations existing or operating within the United States, it seems
that the FBI is virtually unrestrained in how it may engage the assis-
tance of informants for the purposes of investigation or intelligence-
gathering. 208
Furthermore, it appears that individual agents must use their
own discretion to determine whether the information they receive
implicates a foreign national security threat or a domestic security
threat, a decision crucial to determining which set of standards ap-
plies to the use of inforrnants. 2" Such broad discretion for FBI agents
to engage informants without formal guidelines from the Department
ofJustice may be a necessary measure for fighting the war on terror. 210
Or it may prove to concentrate too much power in the hands of the
executive—a power that is subject to greater constitutional and statu-
tory constraint in the criminal context. 2 " In either instance the NSI
Guidelines reflect a definitive policy choice by the current administra-
tion that no rules should apply to the use of informants when foreign
potential terrorists arc involved. 212
205 See DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 1 12, at 12,15.
206 See generally NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112.
"7 INFORMANT GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 1.
208 See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
2°9
 See NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at 2-3, 9-10; supra notes 183-197 and accom-
panying text.
218 See NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at 2-3,9-10.
211 See supra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text. fly contrast, the Office of the In-
spector General has reiterated the importance of implementing and adhering to the In-
formant Guidelines in criminal and domestic security investigations. See OIG COMPLIANCE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 133-35.
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III, THE TROUBLE WITH UNSUPERVISED USE OF INFORMANTS IN
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
A. Effects of Executive Order No. 12,333, MA, and the
Attorney General's Guidelines
The combined effect of Executive Order No. 12,333, FISA, and the
NSI Guidelines is that, in national security investigations under certain
circumstances, the FBI and other investigative agencies currently may
engage in electronic surveillance or physical searches without prior ju-
dicial approval. 2" If the government does not need a warrant, it does
not need to follow the informant qualification requirements of Illinois
v. Gates. 214 Absent the hindrance of Gates and prior judicial approval for
a warrant, federal agents can act on the basis of any tip from any infor-
mant that they choose, without having to demonstrate to a neutral
third party that the informant has a shred of credibility. 215 Further-
more, unless an intelligence investigation results in a prosecution, most
of the protections in place in the criminal context will never be impli-
cated.216
Such unilateral discretion over the use of informants by the execu-
tive branch, and unregulated discretion of individual federal agents to
handle informants, raises several concerns. 217 For one, agents might
become too close to their most valuable informants—shielding them
from prosecution to ensure their ongoing productivity, or even accept-
ing bribes from informants and participating in their underworld ac-
tivities. 218 This kind of behavior was revealed in the Boston FBI scandal,
when it was discovered that FBI agents had protected Whitey Bulger
and Stephen Flemmi for decades because of their value as informants
against the Italian Mafia. 219 However, in counterterrorism investiga-
tions, this concern seems less significant than in the criminal context
because it is difficult to imagine a federal agent protecting or partici-
pating in conduct that is truly threatening to national security. 220
Two other concerns merit closer consideration, however, in the
sections that follow. The first concern is that using informants as a basis
215 See supra notes 128-212 and accompanying text.
214 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983).
215 See id.
216 See supra notes 28-104 and accompanying text.
217
 See supra notes 156-212 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
2217 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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for electronic surveillance without prior judicial review and approval
might violate the privacy of U.S. persons. 221 The second is that without
a judicial check on the use of informants, the concentration of power
in the hands of the executive branch might lead investigative agents to
overstep proper boundaries.222 Each will be discussed in turn. 228
B. NSA Surveillance and Privacy Concerns
When federal agents conduct electronic surveillance or physical
searches in compliance with FISA, their conduct is presumptively con-
stitutional, and a FISC judge must at least be informed of their ac-
tions.224
 However, reports have recently surfaced indicating that the
administration of President George W. Bush has conducted warrantless
electronic surveillance for years at the direction of a secret presidential
order, without any sort of judicial notification or authorization. 225
 Ac-
cording to these reports, the National Security Agency (the "NSA") has
monitored telecommunication data regarding phone calls outside the
United States that happen to pass through U.S.-based telephonic
"switches."226 Although this kind of surveillance is not directed at U.S.
persons, it is entirely possible that the communications of U.S. citizens
will be intercepted in the course of such eavesdropping. 227 The NSA
has not conducted this surveillance under the terms of FISA because
federal agents desire a degree of speed and flexibility to respond to
domestic terror threats that they believe FISA does riot provide. 228 The
NSA surveillance program thus raises serious privacy concerns for any
American using a device as technologically simple as a telephone. 229
22L See infra notes 224-254 and accompanying text.
222 See infra notes 239-254 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 224-254 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 136-175 and accompanying text.
229
 In a series of articles in December, 2005, the New York Times reported that. the Na-
tional Security Agency, acting on a secret 2002 order from the Bush Administration, con-
ducted warrantless electronic surveillance on hundreds of occasions. See James Risen &
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al;
Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Eavesdropping Effort Began Soon After Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, - at 31; Eric Lichtblau, EB.1. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data
Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al.
226
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Whether the executive branch has the inherent power to conduct
warrantless searches or surveillance in the interest of protecting na-
tional security, beyond the scope of FISA, is debatable. 2" Under Jus-
tice Jackson's formula in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), when Congress has expressed its will on a particular matter
that otherwise might exist in the "twilight" zone of concurrent execu-
tive authority, the President ought to be bound by the language of the
legislation."' Because Congress has specifically laid out procedures
for conducting both electronic surveillance and physical searches un-
der FISA, the executive should be bound to follow those rules. 232 By
this rationale, warrantless searches or surveillance within the United
States or potentially involving U.S. persons should not take place
without at least informing an independent court as to what has oc-
curred.233
Evidence suggests, however, that the executive branch has not con-
sistently followed FISA, and the danger of such a practice is that it
leaves an independent court completely out of the loop. 234 Although
the FISC authorizes the vast majority of surveillance applications, and
although FISA substitutes prior authorization with subsequent
notification in certain circumstances, at least with surveillance con-
ducted pursuant to FISA, the court exercises some degree of supervi-
sion over the activity of the executive.235 This supervision does not allow
federal agents to be the "sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally
sensitive means in pursuing their ta- sks.'"236 Whenever one branch of
government unilaterally makes decisions affecting the privacy of indi-
vidual Americans, there is the potential for abuse of discretion and
misuse of information. 237 To the extent that informants provide federal
agents with information that can lead to unsupervised electronic sur-
veillance by the NSA or other intelligence agencies, the executive
branch maronce again bypass courts and retain broad discretion in its
activities, a situation that presents an undeniable threat to individual
privacy. 238
230 See supra notes 136-155 and accompanying text.
231 See 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
232 See id.
2" See id.; supra notes 143-175 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 136-175 and accompanying text.
236 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
237 See id.
238 See id.
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C. The Power of an Informant's Tip
Another concern with a lack of supervision over the use of in-
formants in investigations is that a single piece of information from
an informant has the power to set off a wave of action by law en-
forcement officials, especially when there is a potential national secu-
rity threat. 239 One such situation began on January 17, 2005, when an
anonymous informant called the California Highway Patrol and told
police that he had helped smuggle four Chinese . nationals into the
United States from Mexico. 240 According to the informant, this group
was planning to launch an attack with nuclear material on the city of
Boston.241 The informant was soon apprehended, and he confessed
that his claim was fictional and that he had been under the influence
of drugs and alcohol at the time he made the cal1. 242 Officials specu-
lated that the motivation behind the tip was vengeance; the infor-
mant, it turned out, was actually a professional human smuggler, and
the four Chinese nationals were customers who failed to pay him for
his services. 245 As a result of the informant's false tip, however, law en-
forcement agents scrambled across the country, and a nationwide
manhunt for the poten'tial Chinese terrorists ensued. 244
The informant's tip in this instance did not disrupt a terrorist
plot, because no such plot existed. 245 But a great deal of resources was
expended and wasted, and a high degree of anxiety was caused, be-
cause of a single phone call from an intoxicated smuggler. 246 Because
the tip allegedly involved foreign nationals who were supposedly in-
volved in a terrorist threat, and because the authorities were not in-
vestigating an actual crime but were seeking intelligence to prevent a
future act of terrorism, the ensuing investigation would have been
governed by the broad rules set forth in Executive Order No. 12,333,
FISA, and the Attorney General's guidelines. 247 Consequently, this
single tip could have led to warrantless searches across the country, as
•
See supra notes 122-135 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order No.
12,333); supra notes 143-175 and accompanying text (discussing F1SA); supra notes 176-
212 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General's guidelines).
2" See infra notes 240-254 and accompanying text.





245 Murphy, Tipster, supra note 7, at A I.
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well as wiretaps and other forms of electronic surveillance, unilater-
ally approved and performed by the executive branch. 248
Because the informant in this case did not seem particularly reli-
able, a judge or magistrate might not have issued search warrants or
authorized electronic surveillance based solely on the information pro-
vided in his phone cal1.249
 But because the tip involved an issue of na-
tional security, the emergency provisions of FISA meant that a judge
was not required to approve any searches law enforcement wanted to
conduct. 25° Such an example raises the possibility that an individual
tipster, or even prankster, could set off a wave of warrantless searches
with a single phone call to the local police if that phone call happens to
implicate national security concerns. 251
This incident demonstrates the power that a tip from an infor-
mant has to mobilize law enforcement agencies across the country in
response to a potential national security threat. 252 Otherwise innocent
and unsuspecting individuals may have had their•homes searched or
their phones tapped as a result of one phone call from a drunken
smuggler.253 This incident also demonstrates why the Supreme Court
has imposed rules on using informants to obtain search warrants in
criminal cases: to prevent law enforcement agents from overstepping
their investigatory bounds and intruding on citizens on the basis of
uncorroborated or unreliable information from an informant with
ulterior motives for dropping a dime. 254
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement agents necessarily rely on information provided
by unsavory informants in order to solve and prevent crimes. Over
time, a set of rules has emerged governing how confidential informants
should be used in criminal investigations, in the form of constitutional
jurisprudence, congressional legislation, and internal Department of
Justice guidelines. In the national security context, however, where the
target of the investigation is an agent of a foreign power and the nature
248 See supra notes 122-135 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order No.
12,333); supra notes 143-175 and accompanying text (discussing F1SA); supra notes 176-
212 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General's guidelines).
249 See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
25t) See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(1) (Stipp. III 2003).
251 See supra notes 239-250 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes I 22-212 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
25 ' See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
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of the investigation is intelligence-gathering rather than law enforce-
ment, the Attorney General may authorize electronic surveillance or
physical searches without a warrant. The national security exception to
the Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless searches or surveillance
on the basis of uncorroborated tips from informants, without any show-
ing to a judge that the information is reliable or that the informant has
not provided such information to serve ulterior motives. Furthermore,
the President has authorized a program under which the National Se-
curity Agency has conducted warrantless electronic surveillance on
hundreds of occasions, without following even the minimal require-
ments of FISA. Such conduct poses a threat to individual privacy of
Americans whose communications may be intercepted in the course of
such surveillance.
In addition, successive Attorneys General have seen fit to issue
guidelines specifically establishing the manner in which federal agents
may engage high-level informants. But new guidelines evince a policy
decision that federal agents should not be bothered with practical rules
for handling confidential infortnants in national security investigations.
The rules established by the Informant Guidelines regarding immunity,
payments, bribes, and the nature of relationships between federal
agents and their informants do not apply where the target is an inter-
national terrorist. For now, this may be a tolerable situation, due to the
urgency and difficulty of recruiting informants for counterterrorism
investigations. It may well be that the threat posed by foreign terrorists
is greater than any threat from homegrown criminals in the past. Yet
even if this is true, vigilance is required to ensure that law enforcement
agents do not use informants in a way that violates individual privacy or
oversteps proper investigative boundaries.
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